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The number one concern of some American voters in the 2004 presidential election was
"moral values." This paper is an examination of the American family and its fascination
with so-called traditional moral values. The results of the analysis are then contrasted to
European families, who seem to, according to some research, be less concerned with such
traditional beliefs and values. Moral values are defined, explored, and cross-referenced
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The modern American family is built from a foundation of nostalgia. It is not uncommon
to hear politicians speak of a “return to moral values” or about the “good ol’ days.” So often are
we reminded that we must return to family values, it seems that much of the country has become
obsessed with the idea.
This paper is an examination of modern American family communication and its
fascination with traditional moral values. For this project, it is understood that traditional moral
values include a two-parent heterosexual household, married with at least one child. It is also
assumed that the family members practice a religion of some sort and are in good standing with
the government and law enforcement.
To fully understand the American family’s preoccupation with these values, the
American family is contrasted against the European family (who seem to, according to some
research, lack concern for such traditional beliefs). The paper is divided into two sections.
The first section of the paper deals specifically with the American family. First, I explore
the history of the American family. The United States is, in comparison to others, a very young
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country and its relative infancy does impact family life. I describe some influences on the
American family such as the media, religion, and governmental policy and how these affect the
notion of the modern American family today.
Second, I examine the nostalgia trap that so many Americans are prone to. This is the
idea that the American family should be reminiscent of the 1950’s television nuclear family.
Also known as the “Ozzie and Harriet” syndrome, the trap illustrates the unrealistic aspirations
that many American families subject themselves to.
Third, I will examine why there has been a recent push toward traditional values in
America. In the 2004 presidential election, the decline of moral values was the number one
concern of the majority of Americans. This part of the paper attempts to explain the reasons
behind this.
To fully illustrate that profundity of this project, I also examine Europe’s (as a whole)
family structure and its idea(s) of moral values. I chose to study Europe for several reasons. For
one, Europe has some very interesting similarities to the United States demographically. The
European Union is made of different countries with different cultures, but comes together to
represent something more than the sum of its parts. This synergy, although seemingly unique, is
much like that of the United States and its drastically different regions.
Secondly, many European countries were also founded upon many of the same ideals
that we hold to be true in the U.S. The foundation of both unions is very similar and therefore, is
ideal for comparison. But even considering that many Americans’ ancestry stems from European
roots, the American family is still very different from the European family in several ways.
Moral values are important to Europeans as a whole, but they do not dictate the family’s dreams
and aspirations absolute. The second section of my paper attempts to explain why that is. I
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examine European media, divorce rates, nontraditional families, and various governmental
policies in order to understand why Europeans are not infatuated with traditional moral values or
the decline thereof.
A large part of the European section of the project focuses on the European reaction to
American family values. This is a vital section because it not only helps to understand the
Europeans’ perspectives on America, but it uncovers the intrinsic differences between the two. I
do this through researching European newspaper articles and opinion columns on different
American media scandals
It is through this examination of two similar, but distinct cultures that I hope to explain
the precarious position that the modern family finds itself in. In America, especially, the modern
family has found itself walking the line between public policy and private life, a position that
inherently works against itself. Through my research, I’ve found that European families lack the
fervor that American families have concerning these opposing forces. By studying them both, it
is possible to gain a full and complete perspective of the modern family today. I believe that to
fully comprehend any position, one must research more than one perspective. Studying one
angle only uncovers half of the story.

4

CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN MORAL VALUES

The History of the American Family
Prior to 1850
The study of family communication surfaced during a time period that was
associated with scientific inquiry and analysis - the 1860s. It was during this time that
Darwin’s Origin of the Species was published. People who relied on stories, tradition,
and folklore, to discuss families were now beginning to think about the origin of the
human species and thus, the origin of the family.
There is very little doubt that the family has been around since humans have been
around. In hunting and gathering bands, there is evidence of family in the discovery of
the first "human" footprints in 1978 by Mark Leakey1. Fossilized steps believed to be
that of a human ancestor, Australopithecus, show two bipedal creatures, apparently a
male and female (although there is no way to tell for sure) walking. Following the adult
footprints are those of a child. From anthropological standpoint, these steps show

1

Karl Zinsmeister, “Why the Traditional Family Will Never Become Obsolete,” The American Enterprise
8 (March/April 1997): 28-33
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evolution in the making. But some scholars use the discovery to prove that family has
and always has consisted of a man, women, and their children. They are, more or less,
correct. There has been only one culture discovered so far that took a different approach
to family.
The Nayar culture of South India, for example is the one culture discovered in
which the father does not and is not expected to take on a role in the family. Today, their
practices have been altered, but at one time (prior to British rule in 1792) the Nayar were
a matrilineal and matrilocal society. Once women in the culture reached puberty, they
were ceremonially married to a member of the opposite sex and appropriate caste. After
four days of celebration, the husband and bride would consummate the marriage, after
which, the man had no obligation to that specific woman if he did not want it. In turn,
women may have had several “husbands” and men, literally, hundreds of “wives.”
Because the society was primarily matrilineal, the mothers, grandmothers, and other
female family members were the ones who took care of the daily duties.2
With the exception of the Nayar, the family unit has been around, presumably and
in whatever form, since the beginning of human existence. Our development as children
lends credence to this theory. As infants, we are born at nine months. But this stage does
not mean that we are fully developed. Brain functions continue to develop after we are
born. A newborn baby is also not fully physically developed at birth. For example,
every infant has a “soft spot” from skull plates that shift after birth in order to allow the
head to grow.3
Human infants need the care of another to ensure success in maturity. Babies
2

Bert N. Adams, The American Family: A Sociological Interpretation, (Chicago: Markham Publishing,
1971) pp. 36-38
3
Al Gore and Tipper Gore, Joined at the Heart, (New York: H. Holt, 2002), p. 19
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need constant attention and physical contact to be healthy. The disease known as
marasmus, often referred to today as “wasting-away disease” or “failure to thrive” is a
phenomenon that was discovered around the turn of the century. It was noted that infants
who didn’t receive enough tactile stimulation often died or had severely impaired
communication skills as they grew older.4 Loving touch represents a special bond
between infants and their caregivers that is impossible to replace.
It is understood that the family has been around for thousands and thousands of
years. This in no way means that during its time on earth, the family unit hasn’t changed.
Indeed, the family unit is just as nebulous as ever, changing by the capricious whim of
social implications, cultures, and time. The following section explores the history of the
modern American family from 1850 to the present. This time frame gives an adequate
depiction of the cyclical and sometimes redundant story of the American family.

1850-1900
During the mid-nineteenth century America was still a very young country. The
expanding capitalist democracy inspired an economic change that would shape the
American family into something that we recognize today: the middle-class American
nuclear family.
It was the competition aspect of the capitalist economy that produced a very
radical change in family structure. The increasing gap between the middle-lower class
and the wealthy made social classes even more pronounced.5 Wealthy family members
were always considered more independent of each other, but prior to the mid-nineteenth
4

Virginia P. Richmond, James C. McCrosky, Nonverbal Behavior in Interpersonal Relations, (Needham
Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000) p. 160
5
Stephanie Coontz, Social Origins of Private Life, (London: Verso, 1988) pp. 210-215
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century, many middle class family members were just as independent. In those wealthy
and middle class families, men still worked outside the home, but had no obligation to
return to tend to family. Wealthy women socialized among the elite while their servants
tended to the meals and the children. Poorer families were looked down upon because
they had to rely on all family members to pay bills. But during the mid-1800s the family
structure began to change.
Competition in the public sphere due to a difficult economy forced middle-class
families out of the protective bubble of independent work. The public and private lives
of middle-class families became more pronounced. The home and the family became the
sanctuary from the public business world. The word “individual” came to represent an
individual family instead of an individual person. All decisions made within the family
affected the unit as a whole.
Gender roles were reshaped as men stayed out in the public eye and women
retreated to the home. A women’s role in a middle-class family became more
domesticated. There were not servants to take care of the cleaning, mending, and
cooking. With no money to hire servants, more women assumed the roles traditionally
left to the “help.” The domestic duties that were frowned upon previously became the
social norm.6 If a woman did not take an active role in the household, she was thought
not to have earned her keep.
The change in the role of the American family undoubtedly began to shape the
values for that time; the family was now seen as the “ideal.” Unmarried men were seen
as distrustful, while married men were seen as grounded and successful. A women’s role

6

Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap, (New York:
Basic Books, 1992), p. 97

8
in the home was no longer defined by the people she knew or the parties she threw, but
whether she could perform all the domesticated duties expected of her. Frances Trollope
critiqued this practice as a female observer. She said that the practice of domesticity
forced women in both wealthy and poor circles to only engage in household business.7 It
was from this initial assignment of a gender role that American families became what
they are today. And perhaps it is the practice of these roles that have made the cycle so
difficult to change in the present day. A woman in the mid-1800's had to be dependent
on her husband and her children to make her life of value. It was this “dependence that
was no longer acceptable in the poor [that] became an admirable, even socially necessary,
quality in the wife.”8
This period is the underpinning for the American family as we know it today.
Many of the ideals that were built upon in subsequent decades took their inspiration from
this rapidly changing era of American family communication. Stephanie Coontz suggests
that this critical period was also when morality became a substantial goal in family
communication and that the longing for moral superiority of the late 1800s is not unlike
the longing for traditional family values today. This is not to say that moral values were
not an important part of life prior to this period. However, this period of time is
important because it represents a change in what families viewed as important in terms of
moral values, not the individual.
The cause of this longing for moral superiority, Coontz suggests, comes from the
pronounced (and aforementioned) economic differences of the population. Prior to the

7
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Frances Trollope, Domestic Matters of the American,,(1883) pp. 157, 280
Stephanie Coontz, The Social Origins of Private Life, (London: Verso, 1988) p. 218
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Civil War, there were about 50 to 60 millionaires in the U.S.; after there were 4,047.9
This drastic increase in wealth also produced a balancing increase on the lower end of the
spectrum. Many of the elite saw their fortune as the "survival of the fittest" that the
Social Darwinists had introduced a decade earlier. Coontz points out that in the 1850s,
the Reverend Horace Bushnell said, "Wealth was a reward and honor which God delights
to bestow upon an upright people."10
In the middle was the new middle-class. But instead of striving for wealth and
economic freedom, middle-class Americans strived to distance themselves from the
wealthy, as well as the poor. They saw both cultures as undesirable. This change
became surprisingly less about economics and more about the undesirable moral values
of the lower and upper-class. The very rich and very poor were lumped into a class
lacking moral values together. The wealthy were greedy and insatiable and the poor
lacked motivation, and both were obsessed with materialism.11 For the first time, the
American middle-class family became the standard against which all moral values were
measured.

1901 to 1950
As the 19th century came to a close, the middle-class nuclear family and its moral
superiority over other sects prevailed. The media began to reflect this in the publication
of several “house and home” type magazines. Good Housekeeping was first published in

9

Robert Gallman, “Trends in the Size Distribution of Wealth in the Nineteenth Century: Some
Speculations,” in Six Papers on the Size Distribution of Wealth and Income, ed. Lee Soltow (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1969)
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1887 and Ladies Home Journal in 1883, for example. These publications helped to
reinforce the idea of what a family should be and, specifically, what the women’s role
should be in the family.
Communication theory also began to surface as a scholarly field of inquiry. The
social construction theory of George Herbert Mead, in particular, was one of the most
influential of the time. Mead stated that meaning and “reality” are created through
communication and language; Meaning, that it is the socially constructed world that gives
significance to the people, places, and things around. This theory assumes that anything
in question evolves depending on its surroundings. In terms of family communication,
Mead shows that the family unit will evolve to reflect the socially constructed world
around it. Therefore, the definition of family will always change.
This theory is important to the question of moral values in families because it
shows that moral values are not a lucid and rigid ideal. The need for moral values and
their emphasis in the family unit will change depending on the world around them.
That changing world became more evident and certainly more important to
families during the early twentieth century. The stock market crash of 1929 led to the
Great Depression. Families weren’t as worried about the question of moral values as
they were keeping alive. Survival became the number one priority of the nation. The
fertility rate per women was at an all-time low. Over 1.5 million American women had
been abandoned by their husbands. Divorce rates were down, but informal separations
skyrocketed and domestic violence soared. Unhappy couples did not have the money for
the legal fees associated with a divorce. Overall, families who did stay together lost
about 35 percent of their income. Many women went to work where men could not to
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help support their families.12
After the nation began to recover from the depression, people had a new interest
in forming families, but the early 1940s and World War II brought more obstacles to the
front. While young men were out on the line, women went to work in the factories for
their country. By 1946, one out of every three marriages was ending in divorce. Rates of
unwed mother tripled between 1940 and 1948.13 With the country’s family values in
steady decline, it is no wonder that a new chapter in the evolution of the family was just
around the corner.

1950-1959
For many Americans, the 1950s represent the period in which the American
family was at its best. In fact, when most people think of a nuclear family, they think of
the 1950s family. After the tumultuous 1930s and 1940s, the 1950s were a welcome
change to families everywhere. The divorce rates dropped drastically, fertility rates hit
an all-time high, and family was hailed as a beloved institution.
In retrospect, the 1950s really do seem to be the golden age of families, where
everyone was in happy, long-lasting marriages, children respected their elders, and
economic troubles were few and far between. At first glance, the figures seem to justify
the memories. The “Baby Boom” revitalized the institution of family and parenthood;
Many Americans still look to the 1950s as a decade where nothing ever went wrong.
There are, however, major arguments against this idea. The “nostalgia trap,” as it’s
known in relation to the 1950s family, will be discussed at length in the next section.
12

No author listed, “The Great Depression,” [Article on-line] (Eyewitness History, 2000, retrieved January
2005), available from http://www.eyewitnesshistory.com; Internet
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The real history of the 1950s family is much more ambiguous than the media
would have us believe. Most women did not work outside the home, while most men
did. But at the same time, sexist ideologies would make it very difficult for a woman if
she wanted to work outside the home, much like the domestication of the late 1800s.
Out-of-wedlock births may have been statistically lower than they are now, but it is also
true that men and women got married at a much younger age and had children at a much
younger age than they do today. The dialectical differences represent the difficulties in
ascertaining what the 1950s really were all about.
Economically, however, the 1950s were a great decade to live in. Government
programs allowed greater economic freedom for many families. The number of salaried
workers increased by 61 percent between 1947 and 1957.14 This pushed many families
into the “middle-class” economic bracket. Coontz says that the symbol of this economic
prosperity is the nuclear family. She points out that during the 1950s the biggest increase
in consumer spending was on household goods. “Putting their mouths where their money
was, Americans consistently told pollsters that home and family were the wellsprings of
their happiness and self-esteem.”15
The 1950s also lent to one of the biggest influences on family: the media.
Television, especially, became a part of everyday life and for the first time, the public, en
masse, was shaped by the images presented. Families began to gather in front of the
television for entertainment. Televisions were built as pieces of furniture for the
centerpieces of the family room. There is no doubt that the television media plays an
important role in the shaping of the American family. And the shows televised during its
14

William Chafe, The Unfinished Journal: America Since World War II (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), pp.111-118
15
Coontz, The Way We Never Were, p. 25
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inception are the perfect examples of what was supposed to be the ideal for the American
family, according to the upper-class white male whom most often wrote, produced, and
directed 1950s television shows.
First-run television shows of the 1950s were by no means a perfect representation
of the families they were supposed to be portraying. Real 1950s families knew that life
was not like “Ozzie and Harriet.” But like the media of today, the ideas presented were a
mere reflection of the current lifestyle.
When Lucy Ricardo became pregnant on “I Love Lucy,” (despite her and Ricky
sleeping in separate beds) the network wouldn’t allow her to use the word “pregnant” for
fear of offending viewers. It was already a major faux pas to show a pregnant woman on
TV. If implied sex between a married and loving couple on a television show was
considered risqué, it was only a reflection of the attitude toward real sex in the 1950s.
Unmarried teens that became pregnant were shunned and often hid from the public. The
ones who gave birth were encouraged to give up their babies and start anew. It seems
that what the 1940s lacked in moral values, the 1950s made up for it in abundance. And
just as before in the 1880s, the idea of family once again became intertwined with the
idea of traditional values.

1960-present
The 1960s represented a period of upheaval in family values. The whirlwind of
change brought on by the sexual revolution, feminist movement, a fundamental distrust
of the government, and materialism brought the family into a new era. The civil rights
movement illustrated the social instability of the country, followed by the chaotic
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Vietnam War and the opposition against it. Much like the period in the 1930s and 1940s,
the country was often too preoccupied with matters of state and economy to be worried
about family values and traditional morals. And for the next 40 years, in the eyes of
many, the role of the family in day-to-day life began to decline.
Divorce rates began to accelerate16 (they were already increasing, but the 1960s
brought it about much faster). The women’s movement helped women gain more
independence figuratively and literally. Some no longer felt the need to be socialized
into pre-made gender roles. In fact, a Time/CNN poll taken in 1989 found that 94 percent
of women believed that the feminist movement helped women become more
independent. Between 1960 and the late 1980s, typically “male” professions such as
“scientist” or “engineer” saw a drastic increase in women employed.17
The 1970s and 1980s illustrated the further decline of traditional moral values in
America. By 1984, one U.S. magazine called the outlook for the traditional American
family “bleak” at best. This was at a time when 57.8 percent of women were in the labor
force, compared to 34.8 percent in 1960.18
More women working outside the home in the 1980s contributed to a larger net
income for two-parent households. Working wives boosted household income by a
median of $30,300 in 1982. This money helped boost the economy and maintained an
independence from family often associated with the decade. Cyclically, increased
income meant increased spending, which meant increased debt, which meant the need for
more income and thus, time away from the family.
This cycle was well-documented in the media and could have been a prime cause
16
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for the so-called decline of family values that began in the 1980s. The next decade would
show the longing for traditional family values. Chastising the change in family would
become even more prevalent.
The 1990s represented an increase in public awareness about moral values and the
affect of values on the family unit. Early in the decade, the country began to question
moral values in terms of censorship in the media.
At the forefront of the war against objectionable values were America’s political
leaders. In 1992, then-Vice President Dan Quayle gave what is now known as the
“Murphy Brown” speech outlining the importance of having a traditional family while
haranguing a television sitcom for portraying a single mother by choice.. He said:
It doesn't help matters when prime time TV has Murphy Brown - a
character who supposedly epitomizes today's intelligent, highly paid,
professional woman - mocking the importance of a father, by
bearing a child alone, and calling it just another “lifestyle choice.” I
know it is not fashionable to talk about moral values, but we need to
do it. Even though our cultural leaders in Hollywood, network TV,
the national newspapers routinely jeer at them, I think that most of
us in this room know that some things are good, and other things are
wrong.19
The question, of course, is what constitutes as good and what constitutes as
wrong? Dan Quayle says that raising a child without a father around is wrong, but
critiques of his view say that raising a child without a father is better than raising a child
with a bad father who is around all the time. The battle between the two is what makes
this problem so difficult to define and the solution even more difficult to find. The
debate over family values was in the works long before the Murphy Brown comment, but
it was Quayle’s speech that served as the catalyst for present-day American media
attention.
19
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After Dan Quayle, the next Vice-President, Al Gore, has his own way of dealing
with family values. Gore and his wife, who were forerunners in advocating censorship in
the music media, outlined some of the changes the family has seen in the last 40 years in
their book on family values “Joined at the Heart”. In list form, the changes seem
overwhelmingly negative. They say that:
•

Married couples with children only constitute 35 percent of the families
compared with over 50 percent in 1960.

•

There are more single-parent households, though they are still not a majority.

•

Thirty-three percent of children are born to unwed mothers, compared with 5
percent 40 years ago.

•

Marriage rates have steadily declined from 70 percent of the entire “marriageready” population in 1960 to 55 percent in 2000. The number of cohabitating
couples has increased five-fold.

•

Families are forming later: A quarter of all women had not had a child before
they turned 35 in 2000, almost double the rate in 1960.

Moral values are even more important to the American public today than they were
even a few years ago. In the November 2004 election, roughly 20 percent of Americans
cited “moral values” as their number one concern. Conservatives who won the election
on that platform promise to reinstate moral values into the country by challenging a
number of ideals held closely by liberals as civil liberties. Many of the conservatives
have been calling for a return to moral values among the change of the nation. For those
who grew up in a much “simpler” time, the change is hard to get used to. Perhaps that is
why it’s so difficult to let go of the idea of the traditional nuclear family.

17

CHAPTER THREE
THE NOSTALGIA TRAP OF STEPHANIE COONTZ

For those who were very young during the 1950s or not even born, it’s very
difficult to understand what family life was really like. Most of what we know about the
1950s comes from television. Television shows that depicted family life as it was
supposed to be, but certainly not what it was. So why is it that politicians, religious
leaders, and political pundits are saying that we need to return to those family values?
Family communication scholar Stephanie Coontz has attempted to answer this
question for the last 20 years. She says that the 1950s represent the stability of marriage,
traditional gender roles, and innocence for many people. The problems that were around
were often hidden from public view. Today, there are so many different types of families
that the traditional family is outnumbered in all respects.
A Knight-Ridder news poll conducted in 1996, found that more Americans chose
the 1950s as the best decade for children to grow up in. Communities were focused on
family, the economy was stable, and most families were run by two-parent households.
But it is also true, the poll found, that people are often selective about what they liked
about the fifties.20 They don’t miss the lack of civil rights or the misogynistic attitudes

20

Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Really Are, (New York: Basic Books, 1997)
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toward women (when wife beating wasn’t considered a “real” crime21). They want all
the good stuff, but want to leave out the bad. Sure, that is the ideal for almost any
situation. But it is certainly not realistic. In many cases, the “bad” either influenced or
was directly responsible for the “good.”
The 1950s traditional family was a mere blip on the radar screen. Coontz says
that the 1950s family was somewhat of an anomaly, sandwiched in between decades of
social unrest and economic instability. The 1950s are the exception to the rule when
divorce rates decreased, fertility increased, and the age of marriage and motherhood
fell.22 Even if, as historian Steven Ozment says, “there has never been a time when
people didn’t form nuclear families,”23 the 1950s family, Coontz points out was a
“qualitatively new phenomenon.” But for this type of family to thrive civil rights needed
not to exist, gender roles needed to be explicitly practiced and reinforced, and the
economy had to be strong enough to support a family on a single income.
Historian Elaine Tyler May points out in Homeward Bound: American Families
in the Cold War Era:
The legendary family of the 1950s… was not, as common wisdom
tells us, the last gasp of “traditional” family life with deep roots in
the past. Rather, it was the wholehearted effort to create a home that
would fulfill virtually all its members’ personal needs through an
energized and expressive personal life.24
This effort was much easier to come by in a time where racial discrimination was
rampant, women were not considered equal partners, and the economy was strong. If one
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were to take out all the bad things in the decade, he or she may not be left with only good
moral values. When people are nostalgic for the family values of the 1950s, they are not
being realistic about what that entails.
Interestingly, the reinforcement of gender roles in the 1950s was also, by some,
considered to be an anomaly in the course of women’s rights. Largely thought to have
been a direct product of the 1950s, some historians believe that the 1950s, in fact,
interrupted the feminist movement as shown in a Time article from 1989. Female
employment, the article says, had been on a steady rise since the 1890s and the sole
exception to this rule was the 1950s where “motherhood and babymaking became a kind
of national cult: there was a return to earlier marriage, families were bigger, and divorce
rates stabilized.”25
Economically speaking, the male breadwinner with a high school education in
1950 could secure a good-paying job to support his family. But after the oil crises in the
1973 and the years of economic reform, it was simply not possible to support a family
with the same job in 1950 as 1995.26 This put more stress on the family unit.
The nostalgia of the 1950s was brought on and sustained through a number of
different ways: the media, specifically, television being the most prevalent. It was during
the 1950s when television watching became a family affair. White nuclear families
watching white nuclear families on television in 1950 was the norm. Today, television
programs are rerun constantly on cable. “Nick at Nite” started broadcasting old TV
shows in the 1980s and its popularity brought on the inception of the channel TV Land,
which broadcasts old shows 24 hours-a-day. While some parents may appreciate the
25
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values expressed on these shows, they may not realize the standard they may be
proposing to their children. As Taylor points out, television shows in the 1950s
…proposed a family life as a charming excursion into modernity,
but resting on the unshakable stability of tradition. Parents would
love and respect each other and their children forever. The children
would grow up, go to college, and take up lives identical in most
respects to those of their parents.27
As an only child and the product of a “dysfunctional” family, I remember in my
childhood watching “Bewitched,” and “The Donna Reed Show” on Nick at Nite and
wondering why their were so many differences between my family and theirs.
Children are exposed to more objectionable material today than they were 50
years ago, and so it is easy to see why some people are looking for the easiest road back
to 1950. This is primarily due to a relaxation of certain Federal Communication
Commission rules (although in 2004 that started to change) and the availability of
objectionable material through cable TV and parental ambivalence. House Majority
Leader, Tom DeLay, said in the early 1990s that television was responsible the nation’s
troubles along with video games, birth control, day care, broken homes, and abortion.28
We can only assume that he means today’s television and not the programs of yesterday.
As a nation, many have been yearning for a selective past for an uncertain future.
It may seem easy to go back to a more simple time, but theory shows us that that will not
solve any of the problems in the world. People are faced with different issues than their
parents and grandparents were. It is important that the model for future prosperity is not
based off of a decade that has very little in common with the people of today.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MODERN AMERICAN FAMILY VALUES OBSESSION

Recently, the push toward the “return to family values” has been a point of
contention in politics and has brought the debate into the foreground once again. The
2004 presidential election illustrated just how important the American public finds moral
values. Newspapers were attributing President Bush’s re-election entirely to moral
values. Headlines such as “Faith, Values Fueled Win” from the Chicago Tribune and
“Values voters’ key to Bush re-election” in the Fort Worth Star Telegram were plastered
all over the country in the first weeks of November. It seems that the entire debate over
“moral values” and its reflection in the media came from a Los Angeles Times exit poll
question. The question and its subsequent speculation may have added fuel to the fire,
but it is not the only reason moral values are such a big issue to the American public. In
this section, I will examine the now-infamous poll question and what it really means for
moral values. In addition, I will explain why there has been a recent push toward this
moral agenda in the United States.
A Los Angeles Times exit poll conducted on November 2, 2004 at 136 polling
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places found that 22 percent of people thought that moral and ethical values were the
most important factor in deciding who voters would vote for. The poll found that 54
percent of Bush’s supporters 24 percent of Kerry supporters said it was most important to
them.29 A Pew Research Center survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research
Associates International on Nov. 5 – 8, 2004 found that moral values mattered most in
deciding how to vote 27 percent of voters. In the days following the election, the
American media broadcast that moral values won the election, bringing the debate into
the public once again.
Many political pundits are speculating that the supposed increase in interest in
moral values is false. According to columnist Morris Fiorina from the San Francisco
Chronicle, the moral values story line “grew out of a single poorly written exit-poll item
that was over-interpreted in the heated context of same-sex marriage prohibitions passing
in 11 states.”30 Fiorina states that given statistical error, the moral values issue is
virtually indistinguishable from issues such as terrorism and the economy (both receiving
around 20 percent).
In addition, defining the term moral values complicates matters. Moral values as
a choice on an exit poll can mean different things to different people. It is a collection of
issues, more so than the choice “terrorism” or “the war in Iraq.” For some, moral values
may simply mean the protection of marriage or anti-abortion laws. For others it may
mean the protection of civil rights. For some it may even be the nuclear family ideal

29

Schlesinger Associates and Davis Research, Los Angeles Times exit poll, [on-line document] (Retrieved
in March 2005) available at http://www.pollingreport.com/2004.htm; Internet
30
Morris P. Fiorina, “Postelection Perspectives 'Holy war' over moral values or contempt for opinion?”
[News article on-line] (San Francisco Chronicle, 21 Nov., 2005, retrieved Feb. 2005) available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/11/21/EDG549TD5K1.DTL;
Internet

23
represented in 1950s media. Regardless, lumping “moral values” in one answer form is
not necessarily indicative of the will of the people, according to Fiorina.
Putting the poll in perspective, Dick Meyer of the Washington Post examined exit
polls from previous election in 2000 and 1996. In 2000, the consortium that ran the
national exit poll did not include an answer choice for moral values. It seemed,
according to Meyer, that any answer would have been deeply influenced by the Monica
Lewinsky affair and thus not very useful. But in 1996, the moral values answer choice
was listed on the exit poll survey. Seventeen percent of voters listed it as their top
concern (second only to “health of the economy”). From 17 to 22 percent in 8 years is
not exactly mandate for the return of values. So why have the media framed this issue as
the deciding factor for voters in the 2004 election?
Put simply, the media have an agenda to inform the public, but in doing so they
often, perhaps even unwittingly, tell the public what to think about. The agenda-setting
theory of Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw says that the news media influence
public opinion in a cause and effect chain. For example, in an experiment run by Yale
researchers, three groups of people saw news broadcasts of three different news programs
highlighting certain issues such as economic inflation, national defense, and the
environment, respectively for four straight days. At the end of each viewing, the people
were asked to fill out a questionnaire about their own concerns. Each group listed their
top concern as the issue that their program respectively highlighted. The experiment
showed that the public tends to care more about the issues that they see or read more
often.
In the 2004 election, moral values were discussed at length. For example, a
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simple Google search of “U.S. moral values” returns over 4,900,000 hits. Applying this
to the agenda-setting theory, the more Americans heard about moral values or the decline
thereof, the more they began to think of its importance. This, again, was reinforced by
the coverage of the exit polls.
Framing moral values as the center piece of American decision in the election
serves several purposes. For one, it reinforces the fact that the Republican candidate
won. Bush ran his campaign on certain platforms that are associated with moral values
including same-sex marriage bans and anti-abortion laws. Citing that moral values were
the number one concern of voters symbolically proves that the country was behind him.
Secondly, it appeases some of the criticism that surrounded Bush in the run-up to the
election, mostly the war in Iraq and the economy.
There have been two long-term trends that can help explain why there has been a
recent push toward the return to moral values. According to Lynne Casper and Suzanne
Bianchi, the first trend is that the people whom are pushing for moral values tend to only
see the family unit a linear model. Casper and Bianchi say that there is a unfounded
tendency to believe changes in the family “have been linear, and will continue, unabated,
indefinitely.”31 As illustrated in my section on the history of the American family,
throughout the last 150 years, the American family has gone through changes that are
anything but linear. There were decades that resembled each other greatly in terms of
statistics and economy, some that were drastically different, and some that were
considered transitory in nature. It would make sense, then, that those who want to keep
family values a certain way fear any type of change.
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The other tendency is that scholars who wish to illustrate the declining of moral
values often chose a particular point in time that will support the arguments that they
want to make. For example, one can make a better case for a return to moral values in
the 1950s than he or she can in the 1930s and those changes can be exaggerated or
minimized depending on the intention.
Another reason people have looked to the return of moral values, is a simple
matter of childhood nostalgia. Expounding on Stephanie Coontz’ theory, many people
look back to their childhoods as a more simple time. It is no coincidence that the Knight
Ridder poll cited earlier said the 1950s were a decade that most people would want to
grow up in. The majority population age group did grow up in the 1950s. These are the
same people who, in that decade, were either children or young adults who today are
touting the praises of a moral America. Today, the media agenda equates moral values
and the 1950s family as synonymous, when with a bit of research and common sense, we
know that not to be true. In retrospect, childhood will always be a simpler time. It could
be just a coincidence that “childhood” for many Americans means childhood in the
1950s. This, in turn, is perpetuated in the media through news and family sitcoms from
the decade.
Finally, an issue that is inextricably tied to moral values is also a reason why the
American public has seen an increase in moral values coverage. One can not discuss
moral values without including the role religion plays. Americans, in general, tend to be
a religious group of people. There have been many surveys of the American people
citing different results when assessing the numbers of religious people in America. But
generally, surveys have found that around 80 percent of Americans cite some personal
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belief in religion or a God. Of that number, about 75 percent believe in a Christian God.
Many Christian Americans use the Bible as the source to determine what is moral
and what is not. For instance, George W. Bush uses religion in his many public
addresses and to make everyday decisions in the White House.32 Religion is clearly a
part of life for a majority of Americans, but is religion the reason why Americans are
obsessed with morality?
There is a view called the “Divine Command Theory of Ethics” that suggests
morality comes from God who wills it to be done. For many Christians, this is the theory
that proves morality and religion are inextricably tied. For them, there is no morality
without religion.33 In addition, there seems to be a general assumption that most religious
people are more ethical or have better values than nonreligious people. But according to
a study by the Josephson Institute of Ethics that is only slightly true.34 There is no
conclusive evidence that religious people are more “moral” than nonreligious people.
We can site religion as a general influence for moral thinking or intention, but there is
little indication that religious thinking influences moral action.
The reasons that Americans have become obsessed with family values are not
independent of each other. The linear model influences morals, which influences the
media agenda, which influences the question of morality in religion. Or it could be the
other way around. The reasons why morality has become such a large part of American
life are amalgamate. There is no one reason because they all influence one another.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE EUROPEAN FAMILY AND ITS MORAL VALUES

Defining the European Family
When we think of the “European family,” a rush of images does not come flowing
to our heads as if someone were to say “picture the American family.” Most of the world
has a clear idea of what the American family is and by whom it is influenced. Regardless
of the worldly opinions of the American family, it is clear that there is, indeed, a certain
prototype.
The European family is more vague. Even though the European Union has its
own currency, customs, and constitution, it is difficult to imagine the European family as
a single unit. It would seem that there are too many countries and cultures to make a
distinct idea of what an E.U. family looks like. Then why is it that the United States of
America with its different regions, states, dialects, cultures, and values has this singular
idea and the E.U., similar in respect, does not?
This section of the paper attempts to explain this difference by examining the
European family in contrast to the American family. I will begin by briefly examining
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the history of the modern European family and what influences its moral values, or lack
thereof. Second, I will outline some of the divergent viewpoints that are most prevalent
between European and American family values. I will then delve into European
perception of American values by exploring different media channels. This investigation
serves two purposes: To gain a better understanding of why the European values are they
way they are and also to gain more rounded characterization of the American family.
Finally, I will explain why there are such divergent viewpoints between the two states.

The History of the European Family
Before discussing the history of the European family, we must first establish that
the European family exists. The European Union is a qualitatively new unit, and
therefore the E.U. family is a qualitatively new way to look at Europe’s families. When
exploring the nature of the European family, we must keep in mind that generalizations
must be made in order to define certain similarities and differences. This account is by
no means is to be applied to all European families. The European family, as all families
in the world is evolving (especially since the end of WWII). The relative stability in the
continent since the fall of communism in the East has made it possible for Europe to be
considered as a whole. Sociologists and communication scholars are still working out
what it means to be a collective European anything, let alone a collective European
family that has a single label and single meaning.
Due to all these factors, the European family is obviously a bit harder to define
than the American family. It is even harder for an American to define the European
family, especially as far as moral values are concerned. A Google search of “U.S. family
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values” yields about 4.9 million hits, whereas “European family values” yields just over 2
million. This is not a small discrepancy.
In researching the modern European family, we must take into account certain
historical events that changed the make-up of the family, particularly World War II and
the East/West Communist divide. These events reshaped both country borders and
European life. The recovery period that came after the war affected the European family
in several ways. For one, it was humbling for many families to pick up the pieces left
from the fall of the Nazi regime. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the end of the
war signified the beginnings of the next great influence: socialism. According to Jack
Goody, these socialist regimes affected families in several ways. Through government
programs European socialist countries “set aside religious constraints and permitted
divorce and abortion, lowering the birth rates, increasing the employment, education, and
the opportunities for women more generally, providing communal care for their children
both in and out of school.”35 Because of this, less emphasis was placed on the family
unit. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of East Germany, communism
disappeared in Europe, but the differences between Eastern and Western Europe did not.
Since 1992, Europe has evolved into a period of relative stability. And it is from this
most recent time that the modern European family has begun to evolve again.
The European family suggests some similarities with the American family on a
superficial level. The state of the family has evolved from a unit that originally was
defined by material objects to a unit that is focused on people.36 The family is based on
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people through both autonomy and a collective life. Based on census data, more than
two-thirds of households have at least one family living in them. Sixty-three percent of
those families are considered to be nuclear. Demographically, it seems that the farther
South, the greater the size of the family – including extended families. But beyond these
broad generalizations, defining the European family is something more difficult.
The European family has handled all of the hardships of the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries that American families have and with similar results. But, Americans tend
to want a more denotative definition even if there isn’t one. The Americans define family
in a certain way even if, as the last section proved, it isn’t representative of the general
population. Europeans, for the most part, are not quite as interested in defining their
family unit and the moral values associated with it (as shown by the Google responses).
So, instead of searching aimlessly for a clean-cut definition of a European family, I will
explore the idea in terms of family values to help give the unit meaning including
divorce; women advancing in the workforce; single, cohabitating parents, and
nontraditional families; and religion.
The European family has gone through many changes in terms of divorce. Much
like the U.S., there has been a decline in the number of marriages performed, an increase
in the number of divorces, and an increase in the average age that people get married at.
The number of divorces nearly quadrupled from 1960 to 1996, according to Council of
Europe.37 This increase has been stable since 1985. The lowest rates of divorce were
found in Italy and Greece, whom in 1999 had respective divorce rates of .60 and .90 per
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1000 marriages.38
The divorce rates are often attributed to women’s advancement in the working
world. The divorce rates and the structure of the employment force do seem to have a
positive correlation, although no causal relationship has been proved. Prior to World
War II, married women were banned from working in the British Civil Service. But with
more emphasis placed on women’s education, the women’s movement, and the increase
of competition in the European economy, women in the workforce became a norm. Now,
in many northern European countries, women outnumber men.39 The ever-increasing
numbers affect the family life several ways. For one, with time and money stretched to
the limit, women in Europe generally do not have more than two children. Men have
been shown to help out more around the house, but women usually bear the majority of
household chores and child-care responsibilities. This, no doubt, places strains on the
family unit.
The European Union has been, overall, very accepting of the changing values and
norms of the family unit. Many different types of nontraditional families have surfaced
in the past decades including a rise in single-parent households, cohabitating couples, and
gay and lesbian families. Unlike American policy-makers, the change in family in
Europe is not viewed as “the end of family.” The problem in examining these new
families is that there is not much data on them. There is more information on single
parents because their marital status is kept on record with a country’s government. But as
far as cohabitating and gay and lesbian couples are concerned, information is sparse.
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Cohabitating couples have no legal rights to each other and are therefore considered
single in the eyes of the government. While some gay and lesbian families are
considered legal in some European countries, their legality is a relatively new
development and so there is not enough established information to conduct any
worthwhile analysis.40 Recently, however, the E.U. parliament called for gay marriage
rights across the Union. While new families are not the norm, they are gaining in
numbers and in acceptance.
Most of the opposition to gay marriage in Europe in based in religion. In contrast
to America, religion in European countries has been playing a less pivotal role. The
secularization of the continent has influenced the family unit as well from the invention
and use of contraceptives in family planning to the general acceptance of divorce.
Religion, specifically Christianity, has decreased as a part of everyday life for many
Europeans. For instance, there is no mention of God or religion in the E.U.
Constitution,41 religious apparel has been banned in schools in France and Germany, and
often a majority of residents identify themselves as atheists. Several studies have been
conducted, and while there are minor discrepancies in their numbers, the results show
that Europeans, as a whole, are not very religious. In a 2004 study, Norris and Inglehart
found that the least religious country in the E.U. was Sweden, where 64% of respondents
claimed not to believe in a God. In contrast, the most religious country was Poland
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where only three percent claimed not to believe in a God.42
These values are what shape the ever-changing definition of the European family.
In the next section, I will more closely examine how the divergent viewpoints in
connection with moral values came to be including recent wartime policy, the media, and
governmental policy. Finally, I will examine a small sect of Europeans whom, like many
Americans, believe family values and religion should return to Europe as an everyday
way of life.
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CHAPTER SIX
DIVERGENT VIEWPOINTS BETWEEN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN FAMILIES

Influences on the Divide
Americans and Europeans have, in modern times, shared a special relationship.
Through wars and foreign-policy debates they have continued to support each other. The
relationship was born out of World War II and became stronger with the defeat of
Communism and the end of the Cold War. Even when relations are strained (as can be
shown currently in 2005), Europeans generally still have a favorable opinion of
Americans.43 So why are some American restaurants and cafeterias naming their fried
potatoes Freedom Fries in opposition to the French? Why did some Americans start
writing letters warning the British to keep out of the November 2004 elections? The
perception is that Americans and Europeans are moving farther and farther apart on the
values scale. While the question of when is of much debate,44 the catalyst for much of
this speculation seems to be the partial opposition to the war in Iraq launched in 2003 by
the U.S. and President Bush. Europeans have sited America’s growing ethnocentrism
and unilateralist outlook for the growing hostility where Americans have cited Europeans
loss of values and too-liberal stance on certain issues.
Definition of moral values is the most fundamental issue when discussing
opposition. Too often, we are operating under the assumption that we are all talking
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about the same thing. American moral values are considered to be religious moral
values: pro-life, anti-gay, pro-family, protecting the innocent, etc. These values are fairly
exclusive, unwavering from their opinion or goal. Now what can be characterized as
European family values are more public issues; issues that could include equality,
diversity, and the economy.
The problem comes when proponents of each side try to herald their position as
more “moral.” A British paper attacking American definition of moral values said, “The
collapse of Enron, wages to low to sustain families and tax cuts that hurt the poor are not
defined as moral issues, even though the World Health Organisation has reported a return
in the US of diseases more usually associated with poverty in developing countries.”45
It seems, then, that as the American definition becomes increasingly narrow, the
European definition becomes broader. For example, one of the issues that European’s
site as a reason for growing unhappiness with the U.S. was the United States’ refusal to
sign the Kyoto treaty on global warming. Many Europeans view environmental concerns
as moral issues, and the rejection of such represents a symptom of a larger problem. As
quoted in an article about U.S. unilateralism, Christopher Bertram, the Director of the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin said: “There’s one
fundamental difference, and it’s not just Kyoto or the ICC. It’s whether truly
international issues should be met with a truly international approach. This is a deeply
held view in Europe.” In the spirit of reciprocity, Europeans are not quite as keen to
partake in a war that’s morally importantly to the U.S. administration when they’ve had
little or no support in the issues that are morally important to them like the Kyoto treaty.
Understanding that there is disagreement between Europeans and Americans on what
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constitutes as moral values is something that is plastered all over newspapers. But not
very many scholars have tried to indicate why this might be the case.
Discerning the reason this split on definition occurred is not quite as difficult as
one would think. It goes back to the inception of the modern family and how it was
defined then. Taking the idea of moral values being either a narrow and closed ideal or a
broad and open ideal, as pointed out in The Independent article is interesting rhetoric.
Americans see moral values as a private issue that has worldly consequences, where as
Europeans see worldly moral issues that have individual consequences. In the History of
the American family section, I discussed the economic influences that helped shape the
American family into what it is today. The division of the private and public spheres
helped define gender and family roles for American families. While the next few
decades in the early twentieth century helped redefine those roles, the 1950s put them
back on track. From there, Americans have spent the last 50 or so years trying to
redefine those roles again, and this redefinition of public and private is where our
problems stem from.
The juxtaposition of maintaining good moral private values and still having
equality and diversity are two opposing forces. Trying to balance these forces leads to
confusion. In an Op/Ed piece, one author speculates:
People today, at the end of a century of revolution in private life
remember, at the beginning of the century it was not even possible
to divorce are wrestling with new ideas of how to create a private
life that is meaningful and honest, has integrity and satisfies them, in
the face of a climate that preaches only old values are good values,
only ‘family values’ can save civilization.46
The private and public lives of men and women have become blurred, and so what was
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once a clear and concise definition of family values has become more convoluted.
When Europeans call on American leadership to look at the environment or
poverty levels as moral issues, it does not register quite as well because those issues are
not within the realm of American family values. Some politicians, particularly the leftleaning Democrats, have tried in the past to take on those issues. But as the American
public calls for family above all, Democrats are left torn between broadening the
definition or losing voters. The have invariably chosen to avoid the latter and thus, the
rift between Americans and Europeans continues.
European values have always been associated with the larger public and not the
private family. This trend has emerged and has continued to evolve since WWII. But it
has only been a recent development, however, that the E.U. is being more vocal about
their opposition to the U.S. and its definition. This is due, in part, to the idea that
American interests are forcing values upon the rest of the world under the guise of
democracy. In 2001, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made a speech
detailing the importance of the partnership between Europe and America and the values
that they hold collectively. She said: “Europe and America are partners today. They will
continue to be partners tomorrow and the day after – strong partners. Not because of the
inertia of common history but because of common interests, and, indeed, common
values.”47 As research shows, however, the values are not so common. In an opinion
column, one reader comments on what seems to be a moral paradox.
The central issue in Ms. Rice’s article seems to be her (and by
extension Americans’) perception of values. This was, is and will
be the main obstacle in any smooth relations between the United
47
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States and the rest of us. It is truly naïve for Ms. Rice to say that
“American values” are not “American” but “universal.” This
peculiarly American attitude is what rubs everyone the wrong way.48
Much of the opposition to America and its definition of moral values, it seems, is
political. And considering these statements were made before the War in Iraq in 2003,
the reader’s comment holds more levity.
War will always evoke strong reactions, both positive and negative. When the
U.S. decided to go to war in early 2003, European reaction was mixed. The British and
the Polish being the most enthusiastic, while the French and the Germans being the most
opposed. It seems that since that time relations have been shaky at best. One French
diplomat said in relation to their opposition to the war: “Very few European countries are
used to saying no to the United States. France has a long history of debate with America,
but other countries aren’t so used to this.”49
Europeans also have a hard time dealing with the Christian-Right of America and
what they view as moral or ethical (again, a question of definition not of principal). As a
basically secular society, Gilles Andreani, a French foreign policy scholar, says that
Europeans may have trouble “dealing with a government that may be pragmatic but has
its values – religion, a certain order of society – so up front.” He continues, “For our
secular society, the idea that a presidential candidate would explain how he feels about
Jesus is bizarre.”50 Religion as a moral compass is something that is taken for granted in
American Christianity. But in Europe it’s hard to imagine morality in a causal
relationship with religion, simply because religion does not play an important role in
48
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everyday life. The question of religion and morality between Europe and the U.S. comes
down to a fundamental misunderstanding of what morality is. To Europeans, morality is
not tied in with religion,51 but with a feeling of community value.
The media have a profound impact on how both Americans and Europeans live
their lives, especially in the way the Americans and Europeans view each other. The
media, specifically television, can help to explain the growing differences between the
different definitions of morality. Television in Europe, for example, has long been
considered to be more “liberal” than television in America according to David
Buckingham, a television specialist at the University of London.52 This is due, in part, to
the lack of a central censoring agency such as the Federal Communications Commission
as in America. Each country has their own rules and regulations as far as what is to air
on television and radio. By and large, most television programs in Europe would
probably never make it to network airwaves in America.
In the United Kingdom, for example, a version of the stage musical “Jerry
Springer: The Opera” has been shown uncut on the BBC. The show includes a cast of
transsexuals, profanity, and a man in a diaper. “The Naked News” a show that originated
in Russia, has made it to the public airwaves in England. It features news anchors who
routinely shed their business suits as they recite the news until they are completely in the
buff. In America, a version of the show can only be seen on Pay-Per-View Erotica
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channels in seedy motels.53 In Italy, a plastic surgery show called “Scalpel! No One is
Perfect” showed flat-chested women (unedited, of course) in surgery for breast
augmentation.
These instances are not a new development. European media has always been
considered “racier” than its American counterparts. In the U.K., the comedy “Are You
Being Served?” which ran from 1972 to 1985 the characters routinely made allusions and
jokes about a gay character named Mr. Humphries, something really not made popular in
America until “Will & Grace” aired in 1998. Many of the adult-centered programming in
Europe is aired late at night (usually after 10:30 or 11:00 p.m.) and is considerably more
explicit.
Perhaps part of the reason there doesn’t seem to be a need for decency in
European TV is because there was no “1950s culture” to compare it to. Europeans began
private television viewing around the same time as Americans, but there was no family
values standard for the types of programming broadcast. According to a recent BBC poll,
the decade with the best TV was 1970s with shows like The Benny Hill Show, which
glorified sexual proclivities.
There have been some debates in Europe as to what is appropriate for the
airwaves. In Germany, for example, a national media commission was set up to promote
standards for TV, radio, and the Internet. But even so, just last year, the daily newspaper
Bild ran a front-page story with a topless photo.54
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EUROPEAN REACTION TO AMERICAN MORAL VALUES SCANDALS

Examining European media, however, shows that there is more, in the eyes of
Americas, indecent sexual exploitation, but it does not really prove how Europeans feel
about American media and its connection with moral values. Events in the American
media that compromised the integrity of American values were considered by many
Europeans to be no big deal. Starting with the affair between Monica Lewinski and
President Clinton to the more recent Janet Jackson wardrobe malfunction. Europeans
have consistently pooh-poohed American priorities.
In 1998 when the Lewinsky-Clinton affair was made public and Clinton was a
proven liar, America was turned on its ear. There were debates as to the moral compass
of the country then. Pundits were comparing the affair to the Watergate scandal.
“Unrevised history reveals that Clinton's actions and behavior (limited to Monicagate
alone) rivals or exceeds President Nixon's Watergate misconduct.”55 Democrats
questioned the Republicans’ basis for comparison, while the Europeans wondered what
55
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the fuss was all about. Presidents certainly had extra-marital affairs before Clinton. I’m
reminded of President Kennedy (whom had an alleged affair with an East German spy
named Ellen Romisch, consequently putting the country in more danger than an affair
with a 20-something White House intern). One European columnist asked “Does it really
matter whether the US president had sex with someone outside his marriage? Or does
only his job performance matter? How did we reach appoint where the world openly
discusses semen stains?”56 The Europeans saw Clinton’s affair as a private issue, and
thus not about moral values. A Danish paper actually reprimanded Americans for a
“childish obsession with smut and scandals not compatible with a well-functioning
democracy.”57 In America, it was Clinton who was lambasted for his lack of fidelity and
family values.
While it is true that not all Europeans found Clinton’s behavior excusable, they
admonished the situation in a different way, focusing on how the scandal was handled
and what it would mean worldwide rather than the moral aspects of the illicit affair. A
French paper noted:
Domestic politics aside, the White House runs the risk of seeing its
authority challenged oversees…the dollar, already weakened over
the past year, is in danger of footing the bill for Monicagate just as it
discovers that is has a rival in the euro.58
The Berliner Morgenpost said that the scandal had “poisoned the political climate of the
United States,” while a writer for The Scotsman pointed out,
The president’s private conduct has probably fallen short of the
standards expected by many Americans. But the constitution does
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not require that the president serve as the nation’s moral guardian: it
only demands that he acts as its political leader.59
Ironically enough, this shows how far the battle over moral values in America have come.
With the entire hullabaloo over George W. Bush’s re-election on a platform of moral
values, it seems that the president has become America’s moral guardian. For one, he
appoints judges and cabinet members with his moral outlook. He also appoints leaders of
governmental organizations like the Federal Communications Commission to tell the
American public what is moral and what is not.
The most popular example of FCC involvement with moral decency is the nowinfamous Janet Jackson “wardrobe malfunction” at the Super Bowl in 2004. During the
half-time show Justin Timberlake performing alongside Janet Jackson ripped open the
breastplate of her bustier revealing, for 1.7 seconds, Jackson’s breast adorned with a starshaped “nipple shield.” Many American viewers who were watching the game with their
families were shocked at the nudity. The FCC fined CBS, the network that carried the
Super Bowl, $550,000 for the flash. And while it was been proven that nudity is more
commonplace on European television, America’s reaction to the event was perplexing to
E.U. citizens. It left many asking if America was still a nation of Puritans.60 One paper
asked if this was the same country that spends $10 billion a year on pornography.61
A German paper commented:
How reassuring to the rest of the world that the U.S. has its priorities
straight. We, the poorly informed Europeans, wouldn’t have
realized that Jackson’s breast was a more important issue than Iraq’s
missing weapons of mass destruction. But the U.S. media is
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covering the breast-baring incident like the story of the century.62
The paper was right - the same week that the breast incident occurred, a report surfaced
on Iraq’s WMDs; some cited a cover-up, including Jackson herself.
From the start, she suspected that the outage vented against her was
deliberately manufactured – by the Republican Party and its more
overt supporters in the media – as a distraction from the very
damaging news then coming in about Iraq’s clear lack of weapons of
mass destruction.63
Part of the reason the Europeans were so confused, excluding cover up, about the
hysteria surrounding Jackson’s breast was the sheer amount of violence on American TV
that Americans don’t seem to have a problem with. Even 66 ABC affiliates refused to air
the movie Saving Private Ryan on Veteran’s day citing not the horrific and life-like
violence, but the film’s 21 F-Bombs.
War, religion, and media influences help to drive a wedge in what is viewed as
the growing value gap between Europe and America. Consequentially, they influence
each other as well. In a classic case of “which came first, the chicken or the egg?” Does
a secular society promote a more liberal media, which in turn promotes more liberal
government policies? Or could it be the other way around? Just as in defining moral
values, there is bound to be some overlap because these are not distinct issues. Together,
however, they help explain not only the moral values associated with Europeans and how
they feel the way they do. In return, it gives another perspective on American moral
values.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EUROPEANS WHO SHARE AMERICAN MORAL VALUES

There are, on the flip side, a small group of Europeans who see eye to eye with
many pro-value Americans. Their expressions are quite familiar; they are pro-family,
pro-life, anti-gay, anti-indecency, and they are fighting hard to bring moral values back to
a secular Europe. Unsurprisingly, they believe the way to do this is to bring the Christian
Church back into Europe. Heading up the crusade is Rocco Battiglione, a man who is
synonymous with the European family values campaign. He emphasizes, as many
Americans do, the private moral values that are not based in diversity or equality. He
has, in the past, said that he characterizes homosexual behaviors as “an indicator of a
moral disorder,” that AIDS is a divine punishment, and has proposed paying women not
to have abortions.64 Battiglione’s ties with the Church and his fervor for moral values
strike a reminiscent chord with those of the religious Right and neo-conservative
politicians in America. Predictably, Battiglione’s dreams of a united Christian Europe
have come up against tough opposition. In October 2004, he lost a campaign to become
the E.U. commissioner for justice and home affairs; a slap in the face for the so-called
64
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return of European moral values.
The Catholic Church is behind Battiglione and has been calling for a return to
moral values for Europe for a long time. In 1996, the Vatican called for a new campaign
of family values to combat what it called a demographic winter. The Pontifical Council
for Family commented by saying that the European Union was guilty of introducing
specious rights to reproductive health, homosexuality, and abortion and cited Europe’s
higher divorce rates and falling number of marriages on the changes.65
Even more recently, there have been an increasing number of meetings and
conferences to discuss the decline of moral values in Europe. The most popular is the
Venice Colloquium, which has taken place for the last four years. Its goal is to bring
like-minded Americans and Europeans together to bridge what they believe is fast
becoming a trans-Atlantic divide. They say that if 70 percent of Frenchman would have
preferred Sen. John Kerry to win the U.S. presidential election that must mean 30 percent
supported George Bush.66 This statement is highly debatable and based mostly in
hearsay, but it would not be wrong to say that the U.S. president does have some support
in the European Union.
One professor in Scotland disagrees that the moral value problems Europe is
facing are based on religion or government entirely. David Smith, of Edinburgh
University, says that economic prosperity is the root of crime and the breakdown of
family values. “Rising crime seems to be linked with economic growth rather than
deprivation. In particular, economic growth leads to increasing opportunities for crime,”
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he said in a 1996 conference on the matter. Smith says that with prosperity and emphasis
on equal opportunities, families may be comparing themselves to more distant reference
groups. This, in turn, can lead to competition in the family structure and the breakdown
of the family unit.67

67

Andrew Walker “Envy and Inequality Not Poverty, are the Root of all Crime; Professor Blames the
Breakdown of Family Values for Rising Figures.” The Daily Mail, 19 September 1996, p.22

48

CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION

It’s difficult not to take sides on an issue such as moral values. My inherent
biases led me to choose this field as a topic of study. After researching hundreds of
articles that place the blame on the decline of moral values on secularization, a lax media,
and/or unilateralism, I’ve found that, ultimately, Americans and Europeans are no further
than they were ten years ago on conciliation in terms of moral values. There are those
who say that it shouldn’t be a compromise and that we are both entitled to our own
opinions, and they are correct. But for the sake of foreign relations, America and Europe
officials cannot go on like this. The divide across the Atlantic on moral issues is one
small part of what could eventually become an even greater divide. Moral values are, for
so many, an issue of deep personal conviction. A small contradiction of moral issues
between allies can quickly become a large-scale debate. Foreign diplomats may go
overseas and schmooze all they can, but both the American and European public know
it’s not working, particularly the younger generations who are becoming more and more
disillusioned with the divide.
When I was searching for research articles for my thesis, I came across a blog
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entry of a young Frenchman who calls himself “Jerome à Paris.” The title of his post was
“*Stupid fucking Americans*. Europeans are losing hope” (As an American, and a
product of a journalistic school of thought, I’m consequently wondering if I should have
censored that F-word). He reacts in his post to the news of an Italian journalist’s
bodyguard’s death by friendly American fire:
Guess what, we're losing the will to complain. It's useless. We've
lost hope. The sad events of yesterday have become typical of
today's America, and we don't expect anything else anymore. We
don't trust you today (as a country and an administration), and we
know we shouldn't expect any different in the foreseeable future.68
To be fair, I do not think that generalizing an entire population based on the perceived
actions of a government administration is completely reasonable. But I can see how this
particular European could feel the way that he does.
Americans have been hearing about moral values for a while now, but prior to
2001, we kept it in-house. Now many Europeans feel that we are forcing our morals on
to others, including them. For whatever reason, this is not getting through to the
administration. In her speech, for example, Condoleezza Rice maintained the position
that American values are the same as European values, which not only undermines the
complaints of the European public, it completely misses the point.
Rice also said in the same speech that some say that although some say “America
and Europe are destined to become adversaries. The president and his administration
fundamentally reject this premise.”69 It’s nice to know that the U.S. administration has
no plans to sever ties with Europe, but if things keep going the way that they are, who’s
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to say that Europeans like “Jerome à Paris” won’t completely sever ties with America?
America and Europe have shared a very special, almost sibling-like relationship
over the years. And like any family, there are dialectical tensions that are bound to
surface from time to time. But as we drift further and further apart, it’s more difficult to
see any reconciliation with present circumstances. Both sides have to really be willing to
cooperate with each other and acknowledge that there’s a fundamental problem of
definition and differing opinions.
In all my research, I came across many accounts of opposition on both sides and
the occasional explanation for such opposition. I never saw a credible and plausible plan
for the healing of the moral value divide. This could mean that both Americans and
Europeans do not want to bridge the gap in foreign relations or that it is not possible to do
so. I highly doubt that it is the latter, and so I sadly conclude that at this time Americans
and Europeans have little interest in understanding each other.
The fault could not lie with one country alone on either side of the Atlantic. So it
is important to remember that if Europeans and Americans are going to come together in
the future, both sides have to understand their roles as both problem-solvers and troublemakers. Chastising each other only leads to hateful speech and irreversible
disengagement.
Both the E.U. and the U.S. are guilty of blindness to each other’s cause.
American administration chooses to ignore popular European opinion, while a European
public scoff at American deep-seated beliefs. It’s hard to say which is worse, and
perhaps we shouldn’t try to make that claim. It is clear to me, however, that without serious
consideration to this issue, Americans and European may become adversaries, indeed.
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